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Distributed forward-backward (half) forward algorithms for generalized
Nash equilibrium seeking
Barbara Franci1, Sergio Grammatico1 and Mathias Staudigl2
Abstract—We present two distributed algorithms for the
computation of a generalized Nash equilibrium in monotone
games. The first algorithm follows from a forward-backward-
forward operator splitting, while the second, which requires the
pseudo-gradient mapping of the game to be cocoercive, follows
from the forward-backward-half-forward operator splitting.
Finally, we compare them with the distributed, preconditioned,
forward-backward algorithm via numerical experiments.
I. INTRODUCTION
Generalized Nash equilibrium problems have been widely
studied in the literature [1], [2], [3], [4]. Such a strong
interest is motivated by numerous applications ranging from
economics to engineering [5], [6]. In a generalized Nash
equilibrium problem (GNEP), each agent seeks to minimize
his own cost function, under some coupled feasibility con-
straints. Both the cost function and the constraints depend on
the strategies chosen by the other agents. Due to the presence
of these shared constraints, the search for generalized Nash
equilibria is usually a quite challenging task.
For the computation of GNE’s, diverse algorithms
have been proposed, both distributed [7], [8], and semi-
decentralized [4], [9]. When dealing with coupling con-
straints, a common principle is the focus on a special class
of equilibria, to reflect some notion of fairness among the
agents. This class is known as variational equilibria, see
[10] or [4] for a survey. The attractive feature of variational
equilibria is their deep relation with variational inequalities,
and in turn with monotone inclusions, which allows one
to exploit fixed-point iterations [11], [3], and tailor them
to multi-agent equilibrium problems. A recent breakthrough
along these lines is the distributed, preconditioned forward-
backward (FB) algorithm conceived in [8] for strongly-
monotone games. The key lesson from [8] is that the FB
method cannot be directly applied to equilibrium problems
with structure, such as GNEP’s, thus a suitable precondi-
tioning is necessary. From a technical perspective, the FB
operator splitting requires that the pseudo-gradient mapping
of the game is strongly monotone, or cocoercive, which is
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not always the case in monotone games, even with linear
cost functions [12].
Motivated by these observations, in this paper, we propose
two distributed algorithms based on operator splitting for
computing a variational GNE in (cocoercive) monotone
games. Specifically, without the additional assumption of
strong-monotone pseudo-gradient mapping, we propose a
distributed forward-backward-forward (FBF) algorithm [13].
Second, under the assumption of cocoercive pseudo-gradient
mapping, we present a distributed forward-backward-half-
forward (FBHF) algorithm [14]. Both our algorithms are
fully distributed in sense that each agent needs to know
only his local cost function and its local feasible set, and
there is no central coordinator that updates and broadcasts
the dual variables. The latter is the main difference with
semi-decentralized schemes for aggregative games [15], [9].
Moreover, our algorithms do not need a preconditioning
procedure. Our main technical results are thus to show global
convergence of these two algorithms to a variational GNE
of the (strongly) monotone game, for suitable choices of the
step sizes.
We emphasize that, compared with the FB and the FBHF
algorithms, the FBF requires less restrictive assumptions
to guarantee convergence, i.e., non-strong monotonicity of
the pseudo-gradient mapping. Computationally speaking, the
main drawback of the FBF algorithm is that, at each iteration,
it requires two evaluations of the pseudo-gradient mapping,
which means that the agents should communicate at least
twice at each iterative step. Compared with the FBF algo-
rithm, our second proposal, the FBHF algorithm, is instead
faster at each iteration, since it requires only one evaluation
of the pseudo-gradient mapping. The FBHF algorithm is
guaranteed to converge under the same strong-monotonicity
assumption of the preconditioned FB proposed in [8]. From
a computational perspective, the FBHF and the FB should
perform similarly. In our numerical simulations, the FBHF
algorithm shows faster convergence. Indeed, the convergence
analysis shows that it can tolerate slightly larger step sizes.
II. NOTATION
R indicates the set of real numbers and R¯ = R ∪ {+∞}.
0 and 1 are respectively the vectors of all zeros and all
ones. The Euclidean inner product and norm are indicated
with 〈·, ·〉 and ‖·‖, respectively. Let Φ be a symmetric,
positive definite matrix, Φ ≻ 0. The induced inner product is
〈·, ·〉Φ := 〈Φ·, ·〉, and the associated norm is ‖·‖Φ := 〈·, ·〉
1/2
Φ .
We call HΦ the Hilbert space with norm ‖·‖Φ. Given a
set X ⊆ Rn, the normal cone mapping is defined as the
operator NX (x) := {v ∈ Rn| supy∈X 〈v, y − x〉 ≤ 0} if
x ∈ X , and NX (x) = ∅ if x /∈ X . The identity mapping is
denoted by Id. Given a set-valued operator A, the graph of
A is the set gph(A) = {(x, y)|y ∈ Ax} The set of zeros is
zerA = {x ∈ Rn | 0 ∈ Ax}. The resolvent of a maximally
monotone operator A is the map JA = (Id+A)
−1, which
is single-valued and firmly nonexpansive. Let g be a proper,
lower semi-continuous, convex function. We denote the subd-
ifferential as the maximal monotone operator ∂g(x) := {u ∈
Ω | (∀y ∈ Ω) : 〈y − x, u〉 + g(x) ≤ g(y)}. The proximal
operator is defined as proxΦg (v) := argminu∈Ω{g(u)+
1
2‖u−
v‖2Φ−1} = JΦ∂g(v). For a linear operator L·, the operator
norm is defined as |L| := sup{‖Lx‖ | ‖x‖ = 1}.
III. MATHEMATICAL SETUP: THE MONOTONE GAME
AND VARIATIONAL GENERALIZED NASH EQUILIBRIA
We consider a game with N agents where each one should
choose an action xi ∈ Rni , i ∈ I = {1, . . . , N}, from its
local decision set Ωi ⊆ R
ni . Let us define the product space
Ω := Ω1× . . .×ΩN and n :=
∑N
i=1 ni. Each agent i has a
local cost function Ji : R
n → R of the form
Ji(xi,x−i) := fi(xi,x−i) + gi(xi). (1)
where x−i = col({xj}j 6=i) is the vector of all decision
variables except for xi. The function Ji in (1) has the typical
splitting into smooth and non-smooth parts. We assume that
the non-smooth part is captured by the function gi : R
ni →
R¯, which can model not only a local cost, but also local
constraints.
Standing Assumption 1 (Local cost): For each i ∈ I, the
function gi in (1) is lower semicontinuous and convex. For
each i ∈ I, dom(gi) = Ωi is a closed set. 
By convexity of gi, it follows that dom(gi) is convex as
well. A classical example for the local cost function is the
indicator function of the local feasible set, i.e., gi(xi) = 0
if xi ∈ Ωi, and gi(xi) = ∞ otherwise. Other examples
are regularizer functions, that promote sparsity, and penalty
functions, as used in statistics and signal processing [16].
For the function fi in (1), we assume convexity and
differentiability, as usual in the GNEP literature [4].
Standing Assumption 2 (Local convexity): For each i ∈ I
and for all y−i ∈ Rn−ni , the function fi(·,y−i) in (1) is
convex and continuously differentiable. 
Next, we introduce the shared constraints that couple the
actions of the agents and that we assume to be affine.
Specifically, we define the collective feasible set
X := {x ∈ Ω | Ax− b ≤ 0m} (2)
whereA := [A1, . . . , AN ] ∈ Rm×n and b :=
∑N
i=1 bi ∈ R
m.
Effectively, each matrix Ai ∈ Rm×ni defines how agent i is
involved in the coupling constraints, thus we consider it to be
private information of agent i. Then, for each agent i, given
the strategies of all other agents x−i, the feasible decision
set is
Xi(x−i) :=
{
yi ∈ Ωi | Aiyi ≤ b−
∑N
j 6=i Ajxj
}
. (3)
In order to perform a primal-dual analysis later on, let us
assume convexity and regularity.
Standing Assumption 3: (Constraint qualification) The
set X in (2) satisfies Slater’s constraint qualification. 
We are now ready to formalize the solution concept
adopted in this paper. Specifically, the aim of each agent
is to solve his local optimization problem, i.e.,
∀i ∈ I :
{
min
xi∈Ωi
Ji(xi,x−i)
s.t. Aixi ≤ b−
∑N
j 6=iAjxj
(4)
Namely, each agent seeks to find his best possible decision,
given the decisions of the other agents. Thus, the solution
concept for such a competitive scenario is the generalized
Nash equilibrium [1], [4].
Definition 1: (Generalized Nash equilibrium) A collective
strategy x∗ = col(x∗1, . . . , x
∗
N ) ∈ X is a generalized Nash
equilibrium of the game in (4) if, for all i ∈ I,
Ji(x
∗
i ,x
∗
−i) ≤ inf{Ji(y,x
∗
−i) | y ∈ Xi(x−i)}.

In other words, a GNE is a set of decision variables where
no agent can decrease its cost by unilaterally deviating from
his strategy.
Next, to decouple the coupling constraints, we rewrite the
local optimization problems via a primal-dual analysis. For
each agent i ∈ I, given the strategies of the other agents
x−i, we define its Lagrangian function as
Li(xi, λi,x−i) := Ji(xi,x−i) + λ
⊤
i (Ax− b) (5)
where λi ∈ Rm≥0 is the dual variable associated with the
coupling constraints, Ax ≤ b.
Under our constraint qualification, the Karush–Kuhn–
Tucker (KKT) theorem ensures the existence of a pair
(x∗i , λ
∗
i ) ∈ Ωi × R
m
≥0, which depends on x−i, such that the
following inclusions hold:
∀i ∈ I :


0ni ∈ ∂iJi(x
∗
i ,x−i) +A
⊤
i λ
∗
i
0m ≤ λ∗i ⊥ −(Ax
∗ − b) ≥ 0m
Ax∗ − b ≤ 0m.
(6)
We recall that the stationarity conditions and the com-
plementary slackness conditions can be efficiently written
as a parallel inclusion. Thanks to the sum rule of the
subgradient for Lipschitz continuous functions [17, §1.8],
we can write the subgradient of agent i as ∂iJi(xi,x−i) =
∇ifi(xi,x−i) + ∂gi(xi). Then, (6) can be equivalently
written as
∀i ∈ I :
{
0ni ∈ ∇ifi(x
∗
i ;x
∗
−i) + ∂gi(x
∗
i ) +A
⊤
i λ
∗
i
0m ∈ NRm
≥0
(λ∗i )− (Ax
∗ − b).
(7)
We conclude the section by postulating a standard as-
sumption for GNEP’s [4] and inclusion problems in general
[11], that is, the monotonicity and Lipschitz continuity of the
mapping that collects the partial gradients ∇ifi.
Standing Assumption 4 (Monotonicity): The mapping
F (x) := col (∇x1f1(x), . . . ,∇xN fN(x)) (8)
is monotone, i.e., for all x,y ∈ Ω,
〈F (x)− F (y),x− y〉 ≥ 0.
and 1β -Lipschitz continuous, β > 0, i.e., for all x,y ∈ Ω,
‖F (x)− F (y)‖ ≤ 1β ‖x− y‖.

Among all possible GNE of the game, we follow the
traditional approach and focus on the subset of so-called
variational GNE (v-GNE) [4, Def. 3.10], namely, primal
strategies that solve the KKT systems in (7) with the same
Lagrange multiplier [18, Th. 3.1], [19, Th. 3.1]:
∀i ∈ I :
{
0ni ∈ ∇ifi(x
∗
i ;x
∗
−i) + ∂gi(x
∗
i ) +A
⊤
i λ
∗
0m ∈ NRm
≥0
(λ∗)− (Ax∗ − b).
(9)
IV. DISTRIBUTED GENERALIZED NASH EQUILIBRIUM
SEEKING VIA OPERATOR SPLITTING
In this section, we present the proposed distributed algo-
rithms. We allow each agent to have information on his own
local problem data only, i.e., Ji,Ωi, Ai and bi. We let each
agent i control its local decision xi ∈ Ωi, and a local copy
λi ∈ Rm≥0 of dual variables, as well as a local auxiliary
variable zi ∈ Rm used to enforce consensus of the dual
variables. Since each cost function depends on the decision
variables of other agents, we indicate with N Ji the set of
agents j ∈ I such that Ji depends explicitly on xj .
We also let the agents exchange information about their
local dual variables via the graph Gλ = (I, Eλ). Specifically,
we consider an undirected graph with vertex set I =
{1, 2, . . . , N} and edge set Eλ representing the exchange
of information among agents on the private dual variables.
An edge (i, j) is present if agent i can receive (λj , zj) from
agent j. The set of neighbours of agent i in the graph is
N λi = {j|(i, j) ∈ E
λ}. We characterize the communication
graph by a weighted adjacency matrixW ∈ RN×N . To each
active edge (i, j) in the communication graph we attach a
weight wi,j > 0, otherwise we have wi,j = 0.
Standing Assumption 5 (Graph connectivity): The com-
munication graph Gλ is undirected and connected. 
Given this assumption it follows that the weighted ad-
jacency matrix W is symmetric and irreducible. Define
the weighted Laplacian as the N × N matrix L :=
diag {(W1N)1, . . . , (W1N)N}−W. It holds that L⊤ = L,
ker(L) = span(1N ) and that, given Standing Assumption 5,
L is positive semi-definite with real and distinct eigenvalues
0 = s1 < s2 ≤ . . . ≤ sN . Moreover, given the maximum
degree of the graph Gλ, ∆ := maxi∈I(W1N )i, it holds
that ∆ ≤ sN ≤ 2∆. Denoting by κ := |L|, it holds that
κ ≤ 2∆. We define the tensorized Laplacian as the matrix
L¯ = L⊗ Im, and we set b¯ = (b1, . . . , bN)⊤.
Let A = diag(A1, . . . , AN ) and define
A :

 xz
λ

 7→

 F (x)0mN
L¯λ+ b¯

 ,
B :

 xz
λ

 7→

 0 0 A⊤0 0 L¯
−A −L¯ 0



 xz
λ

 .
(10)
Let us also define the operator D := A + B, and the set-
valued operator
C :

 xz
λ

 7→

 G(x)0mN
N
R
mN
≥0
(µ)

 . (11)
Let us summarize the properties of the operators above.
Lemma 1: The following statements hold:
(i) A is maximally monotone and LA-Lipschitz continu-
ous.
(ii) B is maximally monotone and LB-Lipschitz continuous.
(iii) D is maximally monotone and LD-Lipschitz continu-
ous.
(iv) C +D is maximally monotone.
Proof: (i) The operatorA is maximally monotone being
the direct sum of the maximally monotone operator F and
the gradient of the convex function y 7→ 12 〈L¯y, y〉 + 〈b¯, y〉
[11, Prop. 20.23]. Furthermore, given κ = |L| and u :=
col(x, z,λ), it holds that
‖Au−Au′‖ ≤‖F (x)− F (x′)‖+ ‖L¯(z − z′)‖
≤(
1
β
+ κ) (‖x− x′‖+ ‖z − z′‖) ,
(12)
showing that A is LA := (
1
β + κ)-Lipschitz continuous.
(ii) The operator B is skew-symmetric, and therefore maxi-
mally monotone [11, Cor. 20.28]. By a computation similar
to (12), it can be shown that B is LB-Lipschitz, with a
constant LB depending on the matrices A and L.
(iii) The operator D is maximally monotone since it is the
sum of maximally monotone operators and dom(B) = Ω
[11, Prop. 20.23]. It is LD = LA+LB-Lipschitz continuous
because sum of Lipschitz operators.
(iv) The operator C is maximally monotone by [8, Lem. 5].
It follows that the sum C + D is maximally monotone [11,
Prop. 20.23].
The following result holds for monotone operators and it
will be recalled later on.
Lemma 2: Let Φ ≻ 0 and T be a monotone operator, then
Φ−1T is monotone in the Hilbert space HΦ.
Proof: It follows from the definition of the inner
product 〈·, ·〉Φ:
〈Φ−1T x− Φ−1T y, x− y〉Φ = 〈T x− T y, x− y〉 ≥ 0.
Now, given the operators A, B and C as in (10) and (11),
we show that the zeros of the sum A+B+ C are v-GNE of
the game in (4).
Theorem 1: The set zer(A+ B + C) is the set of v-GNE
of the game in (4). It holds that zer(A+ B + C) 6= ∅, thus
the game in (4) has a GNE.
Proof: Let Z := zer(A + B + C). Existence follows
from [11, Prop. 23.36]. To show that elements of Z are v-
GNE, we proceed as follows. Let u∗ = (x∗, z∗,λ∗) ∈ Z ,
i.e. −Du∗ ∈ Cu∗. Writing out this condition explicitly gives
∀i ∈ I


0 ∈ ∇ifi(x∗) + ∂gi(x∗i ) +A
⊤
i λi
0 = L¯λ,
0 ∈ −(Ax∗ − b¯)− L¯(z − λ) + N
R
mN
≥0
(λ).
The second condition implies that λ = 1N ⊗ λ∗ for some
λ∗ ∈ Rm. Thus, λ∗i = λ
∗ for all i ∈ I. Summing the
third condition over all the agents gives the complementary
slackness condition 0 ∈ b−Ax∗+NRm
≥0
(λ∗). Therefore, the
pair (x∗,λ∗) is a v-GNE.
From now on, the triplet u := col(x, z,λ) defines the
state variable of the distributed algorithms we describe later
on. The following notation is used: xk = col(xk1 , . . . , x
k
N )
is the action profile at iteration k, zk = col(zk1 , . . . , z
k
N )
indicates the auxiliary consensus enforcing variable and
λk = col(λk1 , . . . , λ
k
N ) is the local dual variable.
A. Forward-backward operator splitting
The aim of this section is to revisit a distributed forward-
backward (FB) splitting algorithm for the distributed com-
putation of a v-GNE, see Algorithm 1 [8].
Algorithm 1 Preconditioned Forward Backward
Initialization: x0i ∈ Ωi, λ
0
i ∈ R
m
≥0, and z
0
i ∈ R
m.
Iteration k: Agent i
(1) Receives xkj for j ∈ N
J
i , λ
k
j for j ∈ N
λ
i , then updates
xk+1i = prox
ρi
gi [x
k
i − ρi(∇xifi(x
k
i ,x
k
−i)−A
T
i λ
k
i )]
zk+1i = z
k
i + σi
∑
j∈Nλ
i
wi,j(λ
k
i − λ
k
j )
(2) Receives zj,k+1 for j ∈ N λi , then updates
λk+1i =projRm≥0{λ
k
i − τi[Ai(2x
k+1
i − x
k
i )− bi
+
∑
j∈Nλ
i
wi,j [2(z
k+1
i − zj,k+1)− (z
k
i − z
k
j )]
+
∑
j∈Nλ
i
wi,j(λ
k
i − λ
k
j )]}
Given uk = (xk, zk,λk), the FB algorithm can be written
as fixed-point iteration of the form
uk+1 = TFBu
k,
where
TFB := JΦ−1
FB
(C+B)(Id−Φ
−1
FBA). (13)
and ΦFB is the preconditioning matrix defined as
ΦFB :=

 ρ−1 0 −A⊤0 σ−1 −L¯
−A −L¯ τ−1

 . (14)
The matrices
ρ = diag{ρ1In1 , . . . , ρNInN },
σ = diag{σ1Im, . . . , σNIm},
τ = diag{τ1Im, . . . , τN Im}
(15)
collect the step sizes of the primal, the auxiliary and the dual
variables, respectively. By choosing the step sizes appropri-
ately, the preconditioning matrix Φ can be made positive
definite [7]. The FB algorithm is known to converge to a zero
of a monotone inclusion 0 ∈ A+B+C when the operators are
maximally monotone and the single-valued operator Φ−1FBA
is cocoercive [11, Thm. 26.14]. Thus, the pseudogradient
mapping F in (8) should satisfy the following assumption.
Assumption 1 (Strong monotonicity): There exists η > 0
such that, for all x,x′ ∈ Ω,
〈F (x)− F (x′),x− x′〉 ≥ η‖x− x′‖2.

To ensure the cocoercivity condition, we refer to the
following result.
Lemma 3: [8, Lem. 5 and Lem. 7] Let Φ ≻ 0 and F as
in (8) satisfy Assumption 1. Then, the following hold:
(i) A is θ-cocoercive with θ ≤ min{1/2∆, ηβ2}.
(ii) Φ−1A is αθ-cocoercive with α = 1/|Φ−1|. 
We recall that convergence to a v-GNE has been demon-
strated in [8, Th. 3], if the step sizes in (14) are chosen small
enough [8, Lem. 6].
B. Forward-backward-forward splitting
In this section, we propose our distributed forward-
backward-forward (FBF) scheme, Algorithm 2.
Algorithm 2 Distributed Forward Backward Forward
Initialization: x0i ∈ Ωi, λ
0
i ∈ R
m
≥0, and z
0
i ∈ R
m.
Iteration k: Agent i
(1) Receives xkj for j ∈ N
J
i , λ
k
j and zj,k for j ∈ N
λ
i then
updates
x˜ki = prox
ρi
gi [x
k
i − ρi(∇xifi(x
k
i ,x
k
−i)−A
T
i λ
k
i )]
z˜ki = z
k
i + σi
∑
j∈Nλ
i
wi,j(λ
k
i − λ
k
j )
λ˜ki = projRm
≥0
{λki − τi(Aix
k
i − bi)
+ τ
∑
j∈Nλ
i
wi,j [(z
k
i − z
k
j )− (λ
k
i − λ
k
j )]}
(2) Receives x˜kj for j ∈ N
J
i , λ˜
k
j and z˜j,k for j ∈ N
λ
i then
updates
xk+1i = x˜
k
i − ρi(∇xifi(x
k
i ,x
k
−i)−∇x˜ifi(x˜
k
i , x˜
k
−i))
− ρiA
T
i (λ
k
i − λ˜i,k)
zk+1i = z˜
k
i + σi
∑
j∈Nλ
i
wi,j [(λ
k
i − λ
k
j )− (λ˜
k
i − λ˜
k
j )]
λk+1i = λ˜
k
i + τiAi(x˜
k
i − x
k
i )
− τi
∑
j∈Nλ
i
wi,j [(z
k
i − z
k
j )− (z˜
k
i − z˜
k
j )]
+ τi
∑
j∈Nλ
i
wi,j [(λi,k − λ
k
j )− (λ˜
k
i − λ˜
k
j )]
In compact form, the FBF algorithm generates two se-
quences (uk,vk)k≥0 as follows:
uk = JΨ−1C(v
k −Ψ−1Dvk)
vk+1 = uk +Ψ−1(Dvk −Duk).
(16)
In (16), Ψ is a block-diagonal matrix that contains the step
sizes:
Ψ = diag(ρ−1, σ−1, τ−1), (17)
with ρ, σ and τ being diagonal matrices as in (15).
We recall that D = A + B is single-valued, maximally
monotone and Lipschitz continuous by Lemma 1. Each
iteration differs from the scheme in (13) by one additional
forward step and the fact that the resolvent is now defined in
terms of the maximal monotone operator C only. Writing the
coordinates as uk = (x˜k, z˜k, λ˜k) and vk = (xk, zk,λk),
the iterates explicitly read as Algorithm 2.
FBF operates on the splitting C+D and it can be compactly
written as the fixed-point iteration
vk+1 = TFBF v
k, (18)
where the mapping TFBF is defined as
TFBF := Ψ
−1D+(Id−Ψ−1D)◦JΨ−1C ◦(Id−Ψ
−1D). (19)
We are now ready to prove the convergence of our
proposed Algorithm 2 to a v-GNE of the game in (4).
Assumption 2: |Ψ−1| < 1/LD, with Ψ as in (17) and LD
being the Lipschitz constant of D as in Lemma 1. 
Theorem 2: Let Assumption 2 hold. The sequence gener-
ated by Algorithm 2 converges to zer(A+ B + C), thus the
primal variable converges to a v-GNE of the game in (4).
Proof: The fixed-point iteration in (18) with TFBF as
in (19) can be derived from (16) by substituting uk in
the second line. Then, writing explicitly the iterations of
(16) and solving for x˜k, z˜k, λ˜k and xk+1, zk+1,λk+1 we
obtain Algorithm 2. Therefore Algorithm 2 is the fixed point
iteration in (18). Then, the sequence (xk,λk) generated by
Algorithm 2 converges to a v-GNE by [11, Th.26.17] and
[13, Th.3.4] since Ψ−1A is monotone by Lemma 2 and
A+ B + C is maximally monotone by Lemma 1.
We emphasize that Algorithm 2 does not require strong
monotonicity (Assumption 1) of the pseudo-gradient map-
ping F in (8). Moreover, we note that the FBF algorithm
requires two evaluations of the individual gradients. In the
formulation of the algorithm, this means that we have to
compute the operator D twice per iteration. At the level
of the individual agents, this means that we need two
communication rounds per iteration in order to exchange the
necessary information. Compared with the FB algorithm, the
non-strong monotonicity assumption comes at the price of
increased communications at each iteration.
C. Forward-backward-half forward splitting
Should the strong monotonicity condition (Assumption 1)
be satisfied, an alternative to the FB is the forward-backward-
half-forward (FBHF) operator splitting, developed in [14].
Let us then propose our second GNE seeking algorithm, that
is, the distributed FBHF in Algorithm 3.
In compact form, the FBHF algorithm reads as the itera-
tion
uk = JΨ−1C(v
k −Ψ−1(A+ B)vk)
vk+1 = uk +Ψ−1(Bvk − Buk).
(20)
Algorithm 3 Distributed Forward Backward Half Forward
Initialization: x0i ∈ Ωi, λ
0
i ∈ R
m
≥0, and z
0
i ∈ R
m.
Iteration k: Agent i
(1) Receives xkj for j ∈ N
J
i , λ
k
j and zj,k for j ∈ N
λ
i then
updates
x˜ki = prox
ρi
gi [x
k
i − ρi(∇xifi(x
k
i ,x
k
−i)−A
T
i λ
k
i )]
z˜ki = z
k
i + σi
∑
j∈Nλ
i
wi,j(λ
k
i − λ
k
j )
λ˜ki = projRm
≥0
{λki − τi(Aix
k
i − bi)
+ τ
∑
j∈Nλ
i
wi,j [(z
k
i − z
k
j )− (λ
k
i − λ
k
j )]}
(2) Receives λ˜kj and z˜j,k for j ∈ N
λ
i then updates
xk+1i = x˜
k
i + ρiA
T
i (λ
k
i − λ˜i,k)]
zk+1i = z˜
k
i + σi
∑
j∈Nλ
i
wi,j [(λ
k
i − λ
k
j )− (λ˜
k
i − λ˜
k
j )]
λk+1i = λ˜
k
i + τiAi(x˜
k
i − x
k
i )
− τi
∑
j∈Nλ
i
wi,j [(z
k
i − z
k
j )− (z˜
k
i − z˜
k
j )]
We note that the iterates of FBHF are similar to those of
the FBF, but the second forward step requires the operator
B only. More simply, we can write the FBHF as
vk+1 = TFBHFv
k, (21)
where
TFBHF = (Id−Ψ
−1B)◦JΨ−1C ◦(Id−Ψ
−1D)+Ψ−1B. (22)
Also in this case, we have a bound on the admissible step
sizes.
Assumption 3: |Ψ−1| ≤ min{2θA, 1/LB}, with θA as in
Lemma 3 and LB as in Lemma 1. 
We note that in Assumption 3, the step sizes in Ψ can
be chosen larger compared to those in Assumption 2, since
the upper bound is related to the Lipschitz constant of
the operator B, not of LD = LA + LB as for the FBF
(Assumption 2). A similar comparison can be done with
respect to the FB algorithm. Intuitively, larger step sizes
should be beneficial in term of convergence speed.
We can now establish our convergence result for the FBHF
algorithm.
Theorem 3: Let Assumptions 1 and 3 hold. The sequence
(xk,λk) generated by Algorithm 3 converges to zer(A +
B + C), thus the primal variable converges to a v-GNE of
the game in (4). 
Proof: The fixed-point iteration in (21) with TFBHF as in
(22) corresponds to the scheme in (20) using the definition
of uk. Expanding the iterations in (20) with Ψ as in (17)
and solving for x˜k, z˜k, λ˜k and xk+1, zk+1,λk+1 we obtain
exactly the steps in Algorithm 3. Therefore Algorithm 3
is the fixed point iteration in (22) whose convergence is
guaranteed by [14, Th. 2.3] because Ψ−1A is cocoercive
by Lemma 3.
V. CASE STUDY AND NUMERICAL SIMULATIONS
We consider a networked Cournot game with market
capacity constraints [8], with N companies that operate over
a set of m markets. Each company decides the quantity xi
of product to deliver in the ni markets it is connected with.
Each company has a local cost function ci(xi) related to
the production process. Each market has a bounded capacity
bj so that the collective constraints are given by Ax ≤ b
where A = [A1, . . . , AN ] and Ai specifies in which market
company i participates. Each market has a price, collected
in the mapping P : Rm → Rm. In general, P is supposed to
be a linear function. The cost function of each agent reads
as fi(xi,x−i) = ci(xi) − P⊤(Ax)Aixi. Clearly, if ci(xi)
is strongly convex with Lipschitz continuous gradient and
the prices are linear, the pseudo gradient of fi is strongly
monotone.
A. Numerical example
As a numerical setting, we consider a set of 20 companies
and 7 markets, similarly to [8]. Each company i has a
local constraint xi ∈ (0, δi) where each component of δi is
randomly drawn from [1, 1.5]. The maximal capacity of each
market j is bj , randomly drawn from [0.5, 1]. The local cost
function of company i is ci(xi) = pii
∑ni
j=1([xi]j)
2 + r⊤xi,
where [xi]j indicates the j component of xi. For all i ∈ I,
pii is randomly drawn from [1, 8], and the components of
ri are randomly drawn from [0.1, 0.6]. Notice that ci(xi) is
strongly convex with Lipschitz continuous gradient.
The price is taken as a linear function P = P¯ − DAx
where each component of P¯ = col(P¯1, . . . , P¯7) is randomly
drawn from [2, 4] while the entries of D = diag(d1, . . . , d7)
are randomly drawn from [0.5, 1]. Recall that the cost
function of company i is influenced by the variables of the
agents selling in the same market. Such informations can
be retrieved from the network graph depicted in Fig. 4. The
communication graph Gλ for the dual variables is a cycle
graph with the addiction of the edges (2, 15) and (6, 13).
As local cost functions gi we use the indicator functions.
In this way, the proximal step is a projection on the local
constraints sets.
The aim of these simulations is to compare the proposed
schemes. The step sizes are taken differently for every
algorithm. In particular, we take ρFB, σFB and τFB as in [8,
Lem. 6], ρFBF, σFBF and τFBF such that Assumption 2 is
satisfied and ρFBHF, σFBHF and τFBHF such that Assumption
3 holds. We select them to be the maximum possible.
The initial points λ0i and z
0
i are set to 0 while the local
decision variable x0i is randomly taken in the feasible sets.
The plots in Fig 1 and 2 shows the following performance
parameters respectively:
‖xk+1−x
∗‖
‖x∗‖ and ‖L ⊗ Id7 λk‖. The
first one show the convergence to a solution x∗ while the
second represent the convergence of the multipliers to the
null set of the laplacian, i.e., to consensus. Fig. 3 shows the
CPU time (in seconds) used by each algorithm.
The plot in Fig 1 clearly shows that with suitable parame-
ters convergence to a solution in faster in the FBF or FBHF
approaches. On the other hand Algorithm 2 is computation-
ally more expensive than Algorithm 3 and Algorithm 1 as
depicted in Fig. 3.
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Fig. 1. Convergence to the solution
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VI. CONCLUSION
The FBF and the FBHF methods generate distributed
equilibrium seeking algorithms for solving generalized Nash
equilibrium problems. Compared to the FB, the FBF has
the advantage to converge under a non-strong monotonicity
assumption. This comes at the price of increased communi-
cations between the agents. If strong monotonicity holds, an
alternative to the FBF is the FBHF that, in our numerical
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Fig. 4. Network graph
experience, is faster than the FB and less computationally
expensive than the FBF.
VII. APPENDIX
A. Convergence of the forward-backward-forward
We here provide the convergence proof for the FBF. From
now on, H = Rn × RmN × RmN and Fix(T ) = {x ∈ H :
Tx = x}.
Proposition 1: If Assumption 2 holds, Fix(TFBF) = Z .
Proof: We first show that Z ⊆ Fix(TFBF). Let u∗ ∈ Z .
Then
0 ∈ Cu∗ +Du∗ ⇔ −Du∗ ∈ Cu∗
⇔ u∗ = JΨ−1C(u
∗ −Ψ−1Du∗)
⇔ Ψ−1Du∗ = Ψ−1DJΨ−1C(u
∗ −Ψ−1Du∗)
⇔ u∗ = TFBFu
∗.
Conversely, let u∗ ∈ Fix(TFBF). Then u∗ − JΨ−1C(u
∗ −
Ψ−1Du∗) = Ψ−1Du∗−Ψ−1DJΨ−1C(u
∗−Ψ−1Du∗). Con-
sequently,
‖u∗ − JΨ−1C(u
∗ −Ψ−1Du∗)‖ ≤
≤ α−1‖Du∗ −DJΨ−1C(u
∗ −Ψ−1Du∗)‖
≤ Lα‖u
∗ − JΨ−1C(u
∗ −Ψ−1Du∗)‖.
Hence, u∗ = JΨ−1C(u
∗ −Ψ−1Du∗).
Proposition 2: For all u∗ ∈ Fix(TFBF) and v ∈ H, there
exists ε ≥ 0 such that
‖TFBFv−u
∗‖2Ψ = ‖v−u
∗‖2Ψ−
(
1− (L/α)2
)
‖u−v‖2Ψ−2ε.
(23)
Proof: Let u∗ ∈ Fix(TFBF) and u = JΨ−1C(v −
Ψ−1Dv), v+ = TFBFv, for v ∈ H arbitrary. Then,
‖v − u∗‖2Ψ = ‖v − u+ u− v
+ + v+ − u∗‖2Ψ
= ‖v − u‖2Ψ + ‖u− v
+‖2Ψ + ‖v
+ − u∗‖2Ψ
+ 2〈v − u, u− u∗〉Ψ + 2〈u− v
+, v+ − u∗〉Ψ.
Since, 2〈u− v+, v+ − u∗〉Ψ = 2〈u− v
+, v+ − u〉Ψ +2〈u−
v+, u−u∗〉Ψ = −2‖u−v
+‖2Ψ+2〈u−v
+, u−u∗〉Ψ. This gives
‖v−u∗‖2Ψ = ‖v−u‖
2
Ψ−‖u− v
+‖2Ψ+ ‖v
+−u∗‖2Ψ+2〈u−
u∗, v− v+〉Ψ. By definition of the updates, we have for v¯ ≡
Bv, u¯ ≡ Bu, vˆ ∈ Cu, the identities u+ Ψ−1vˆ = v − Ψ−1v¯
and v+ = u+Ψ−1(v¯−u¯). Furthermore, since 0 ∈ Du∗+Cu∗,
there exists vˆ∗ ∈ Cu∗ and u¯∗ ≡ Du∗ such that 0 = u¯∗+ vˆ∗.
It follows that v− v+ = v−u−Ψ−1(v¯− u¯) = Ψ−1(vˆ+ u¯).
Hence,
‖v − u∗‖2Ψ =‖v − u‖
2
Ψ − ‖u− v
+‖2Ψ+
+ ‖v+ − u∗‖2Ψ + 2〈u− u
∗, vˆ + u¯〉
=‖v − u‖2Ψ − ‖u− v
+‖2Ψ + ‖v
+ − u∗‖2Ψ+
+ 2〈vˆ − vˆ∗ − u¯∗ + u¯, u− u∗, u− u∗〉.
Since (u, vˆ), (u∗, vˆ∗) ∈ gph(C), (u∗, u¯∗), (u, u¯) ∈ gph(B),
it follows from the monotonicity that ε := 〈vˆ − vˆ∗ − u¯∗ +
u¯, u − u∗, u − u∗〉 ≥ 0. Finally, observe that u − v+ =
Ψ−1(Du−Dv), and that
‖Ψ−1(Du −Dv)‖2Ψ = 〈Ψ
−1(Du −Dv),Du −Dv〉
≤ λmax(Ψ
−1)‖Du−Dv‖2 ≤ L2λmax(Ψ
−1)‖u− v‖2
≤ L2 λmax(Ψ
−1)
λmin(Ψ)
‖u− v‖2Ψ.
Since α = 1/λmax(Ψ
−1) = λmin(Ψ), it follows from the
Lipschitz continuity of the operator B that ‖u − v+‖2Ψ ≤
(L/α)2‖u− v‖2Ψ and the statement is proven.
Corollary 1: If L/α < 1, the map TFBF : H → H is
quasinonexpansive in the Hilbert space (H, 〈·, ·〉Ψ), i.e.
∀v ∈ H ∀u∗ ∈ Fix(TFBF) ‖TFBFv − u
∗‖Ψ ≤ ‖v − u
∗‖Ψ.
Proposition 3: If Assumption 2 holds, the sequence gen-
erated by (18), (vk)k≥0, is bounded in norm, and all its
accumulation points are elements in Z .
Proof: Form (23) we deduce that (vk)k≥0 is Feje´r
monotone with respect to Fix(TFBF) = Z . Therefore, it is
bounded norm. It remains to show that all accumulation
points are in Z . By an obvious abuse of notation, let (vk)k≥0
denote a converging subsequence with limit u∗. From (23)
it follows ‖uk − vk‖Ψ → 0, and hence ‖u
k − vk‖ → 0 as
k →∞. By continuity, it therefore follows as well ‖Duk −
Dvk‖ → 0 as k →∞. Since uk = JΨ−1C(v
k−Ψ−1Dvk), it
follows that wk := Ψ(vk−uk)+Duk−Dvk ∈ Duk+Cuk.
Since wk → 0 and the operator C+D is maximally monotone
by Lemma 1 and has a closed graph [13, Lem. 3.2], we
conclude 0 ∈ Du∗ + Cu∗. Hence, u∗ ∈ Z .
B. Convergence of the forward-backward-half-forward
We here provide the convergence proof for the FBHF.
Proposition 4: If Assumption 3 holds, the sequence gen-
erated by (21) converges to Z .
Since, w − u ∈ Ψ−1Cu, it follows that (u,w − u) ∈
gph(Ψ−1C). Additionally, 0 ∈ Du∗ + Cu∗, implying that
(u∗,−Ψ−1Du∗) ∈ gph(Ψ−1C). Monotonicity of the in-
volved operators, implies that 〈u−u∗, w−u−Ψ−1Du∗〉Ψ ≤
0, and 〈u− u∗,Ψ−1Bu∗−Ψ−1Bu〉Ψ ≤ 0, Using these two
inequalities, we see
〈u− u∗,u− w −Ψ−1Bu〉Ψ = 〈u− u
∗,Ψ−1Au∗〉Ψ
+ 〈u− u∗, u− w −Ψ−1Du∗〉Ψ
+ 〈u− u∗,Ψ−1Du∗ −Ψ−1Bu〉Ψ
≤ 〈u− u∗,Ψ−1Au∗〉Ψ
Therefore,
2〈u− u∗,Ψ−1Bv −Ψ−1Bu〉Ψ =
2〈u− u∗,Ψ−1Bv + w − u〉Ψ + 2〈u− u
∗, u− w −Ψ−1Bu〉Ψ
≤ 2〈u− u∗,Ψ−1Bv + w − u〉Ψ + 2〈u− u
∗,Ψ−1Au∗〉Ψ
= 2〈u− u∗,Ψ−1Dv + w − u〉Ψ
+ 2〈u− u∗,Ψ−1Au∗ −Ψ−1Av〉Ψ
= 2〈u− u∗, v − u〉Ψ + 2〈u− u
∗,Ψ−1Au∗ −Ψ−1Av〉Ψ,
(24)
where in the last equality we have used the identity w =
v −Ψ−1Dv. Using the cosine formula, (24) becomes
2〈u− u∗,Ψ−1Bv −Ψ−1Bu〉Ψ ≤ ‖v − u
∗‖2Ψ − ‖u− u
∗‖2Ψ
− ‖v − u‖2Ψ + 2〈u− u
∗,Ψ−1Au∗ −Ψ−1Av〉Ψ.
(25)
The cocoercivity of Ψ−1A in (H, 〈·, ·〉Ψ) gives for all ε > 0
2〈u− u∗,Ψ−1Au∗ −Ψ−1Av〉Ψ =
2〈v − u∗,Ψ−1Au∗ −Ψ−1Av〉Ψ
+ 2〈u− v,Ψ−1Au∗ −Ψ−1Av〉Ψ
≤− 2αθ‖Ψ−1Au∗ −Ψ−1Av‖2Ψ
+ 2〈u− v,Ψ−1Au∗ −Ψ−1Av〉Ψ
=− 2αθ‖Ψ−1Au∗ −Ψ−1Av‖2Ψ +
1
ε‖Ψ
−1Av −Ψ−1Au∗‖2Ψ
+ ε‖v − u‖2Ψ − ε‖v − u−
1
ε (Ψ
−1Av −Ψ−1Au∗)‖2Ψ
=ε‖v − u‖2Ψ −
(
2αθ − 1ε
)
‖Ψ−1Av −Ψ−1Au∗‖2Ψ
− ε‖v − u− 1ε (Ψ
−1Av −Ψ−1Au∗)‖2Ψ.
Combining this estimate with (25), we see
2〈u− u∗,Ψ−1Bv −Ψ−1Bu〉Ψ ≤ ‖v − u
∗‖2Ψ − ‖u− u
∗‖2Ψ
− ‖v − u‖2Ψ + ε‖v − u‖
2
Ψ
−
(
2αθ − 1ε
)
‖Ψ−1Av −Ψ−1Au∗‖2Ψ
− ε‖v − u− 1ε (Ψ
−1Av −Ψ−1Au∗)‖2Ψ.
Therefore,
‖v+ − u∗‖2Ψ = ‖TFBHFv − u
∗‖2Ψ
= ‖u+Ψ−1(Bv − Bu)− u∗‖2Ψ
= ‖u− u∗‖2Ψ + 2〈u− u
∗,Ψ−1Bv −Ψ−1Bu〉Ψ
+ ‖Ψ−1Bv −Ψ−1Bu‖2Ψ
≤ ‖u− u∗‖2Ψ + ‖Ψ
−1Bv −Ψ−1Bu‖2Ψ
−
(
2αθ − 1ε
)
‖Ψ−1Av −Ψ−1Au∗‖2Ψ + ‖v − u
∗‖2Ψ
− ‖u− u∗‖2Ψ − ‖v − u‖
2
Ψ + ε‖v − u‖
2
Ψ
− ε‖v − u− 1ε (Ψ
−1Av −Ψ−1Au∗)‖2Ψ.
Since, ‖Ψ−1Bv−Ψ−1Bu‖2Ψ ≤ (L/α)
2‖v− u‖2Ψ, the above
reads as
‖TFBHFv − u
∗‖2Ψ ≤‖v − u
∗‖2Ψ − L
2
(
1−ε
L2 −
1
α2
)
‖v − u‖2Ψ
− 1αε
(
2θε− 1α
)
‖Ψ−1Av −Ψ−1Au∗‖2Ψ
− ε‖v − u− 1ε (Ψ
−1Av −Ψ−1Au∗)‖2Ψ.
In order to choose the largest interval for 1/α ensuring
that the second and third terms are negative, we set χ ≤
min{2θ, 1/L}. Then,
‖TFBHFv − u
∗‖2Ψ ≤‖v − u
∗‖2Ψ − L
2
(
χ2 − 1α2
)
‖v − u‖2Ψ
− 2θαχ
(
χ− 1α
)
‖Ψ−1Av −Ψ−1Au∗‖2Ψ
− χ2θ‖v − u−
2θ
χ (Ψ
−1Av − Ψ−1Au∗)‖2Ψ.
From here, we obtain convergence of the sequence (vk)k≥0
as a consequence of [14, Thm. 2.3] for 1/α ∈ (0, χ).
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